@techreport{oai:shiga-u.repo.nii.ac.jp:00009831,
 author = {Oda, Yosuke},
 issue = {No. A-7},
 month = {Sep},
 note = {Technical Report, This article constructs a job-search model in which worker’s ability varies over time; a highability unemployed might lose her/his skills due to prolonged unemployment whereas a lowability
employed might acquire her/his skills due to (implicit) on-the-job training. I numerically
show that both pecuniary reward for short-term unemployed and reduction in unemployment benefits leads to lower unemployment rate, however, the former policy does stimulate career-enhancing of long-term unemployed whereas the latter does not. In addition, numerical analysis suggests that a combination of the two policies can lead to a higher aggregate welfare than when only one of the policies is implemented., CRR Discussion Paper, Series A, No. A-7, pp. 1-22},
 title = {Alteration in Skills and Career-Enhancing in a Frictional Labour Market},
 year = {2013}
}