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Behavioral Difference in Physicians in the Japanese Health Care System
http://hdl.handle.net/10441/276
http://hdl.handle.net/10441/276cf9dd782-30a9-4f61-98cf-0e3bc8243598
| 名前 / ファイル | ライセンス | アクション |
|---|---|---|
A12Kato200902.pdf (324.2 kB)
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| Item type | テクニカルレポート / Technical Report(1) | |||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 公開日 | 2009-03-26 | |||||||||
| タイトル | ||||||||||
| タイトル | Behavioral Difference in Physicians in the Japanese Health Care System | |||||||||
| 言語 | ||||||||||
| 言語 | eng | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | self-employed physicians | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | hospital-employed physicians | |||||||||
| キーワード | ||||||||||
| 主題Scheme | Other | |||||||||
| 主題 | Japanese health care system | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 資源タイプ識別子 | http://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_18gh | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | technical report | |||||||||
| 著者 |
Kato, Ryuta Ray
× Kato, Ryuta Ray
× Kakinaka, Makoto
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| 著者(ヨミ) | ||||||||||
| 姓名 | カトウ, リュウタ | |||||||||
| 著者(ヨミ) | ||||||||||
| 姓名 | カキナカ, マコト | |||||||||
| 著者別名 | ||||||||||
| 姓名 | 加藤, 竜太 | |||||||||
| 著者別名 | ||||||||||
| 姓名 | 柿中, 真 | |||||||||
| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper presents a theoretical framework to describe the behavior of physicians under the Japanese fee-for-service scheme by explicitly incorporating the behavioral di erence between self-employed and hospital-employed physicians into the model. The results show that the overprovision or the underprovision of treatmens and procedures by self-employed physicians depends on the current fee-for-service scheme with the regulated price (point) system. This study also presents that a substantial decline in the number of hospital-employed physicians results in an increase in overwork or unpaid work of hospital-employed physicians as well as in a decrease in the health level of patients at hospital. This result could also be interpreted as a possible consequence of the reform of the Japanese trainee programme of physicians in 2004. This paper furthermore shows that as long as the number of patients treated by both types of physicians is identical, hospital-employed physicians attain lower utility with heavier workloads but give better medical services with the higher health level of patients than self-employed physicians do. |
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| 抄録 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Abstract | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | This paper presents a theoretical framework to describe the behavior of physicians under the Japanese fee-for-service scheme by explicitly incorporating the behavioral di erence between self-employed and hospital-employed physicians into the model. The results show that the overprovision or the underprovision of treatmens and procedures by self-employed physicians depends on the current fee-for-service scheme with the regulated price (point) system. This study also presents that a substantial decline in the number of hospital-employed physicians results in an increase in overwork or unpaid work of hospital-employed physicians as well as in a decrease in the health level of patients at hospital. This result could also be interpreted as a possible consequence of the reform of the Japanese trainee programme of physicians in 2004. This paper furthermore shows that as long as the number of patients treated by both types of physicians is identical, hospital-employed physicians attain lower utility with heavier workloads but give better medical services with the higher health level of patients than self-employed physicians do. |
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| 引用 | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | CRR Working Paper, Series A, No. A-12, pp. 1-[40] | |||||||||
| 書誌情報 |
CRR Working Paper, Series A 号 A-12, p. 1-[40], 発行日 2009-02 |
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| 出版者 | ||||||||||
| 出版者 | Center for Risk Research (CRR), Shiga University | |||||||||
| 資源タイプ | ||||||||||
| 内容記述タイプ | Other | |||||||||
| 内容記述 | Technical Report | |||||||||
